row of flags against the background of the sky

Roundtable: International History and the Legacy of Akira Iriye

The Harvard-based historian Akira Iriye (1934-2026) transformed how scholars write history. Over the course of his long career, he inspired a new kind of international history, committed to the recovery of transnational thinking. Iriye’s death this year is a sad yet fitting prompt for considering the present of international history, and how Iriye helped to shape it.  His scholarly life matters to the Toynbee Prize Foundation for how it influenced a different kind of global history, committed to the idea of a global community in practice as well as in theory.

This roundtable reflects the diverse ways in which Iriye’s career affected the work and lives of other historians. Petra Goedde, who wrote with Iriye, provides us with a detailed and enthusiastic account of his scholarship. Liang Pan, who met Iriye at Harvard, and Charles Maier who worked with him, each reflect on their personal relationships. Maier offers a more skeptical accounting of the value of culture in political history. Pan rests his reflection in a personal appreciation of Iriye’s mentorship. Glenda Sluga was lucky enough to be invited by Akira to hang out at the Weatherhead Centre at Harvard at a time when his generosity made space for the innovative likes of David Armitage, David Engerman, Jessica Gienow-Hecht, and Jonathan Hansen. In Sluga’s own contribution here, she uses the opportunity to reflect on the significance of Akira’s emphasis on the transnational, and its persistence as a priority for historical practice.

Iriye’s work stood out not just for its analytical interventions, but also for its clear prose. Iriye remains eminently teachable. When Heidi Tworek was teaching a new lecture course in spring 2026 to first-year undergraduates on global history since 1900, she used Iriye’s introduction to an edited volume on the Russo-Japanese War as the first reading of the course. It remains the best reading for explaining the war in a global context. Students quickly grasped how Iriye embedded the war into five broader mechanisms of global governance: imperialism, nationalism, regionalism, internationalism, and transnationalism.[1] Even though comparatively few students had even heard of the Russo-Japanese War prior to the course, Iriye’s work left them with a clear sense of why the conflict mattered and why it warranted inclusion in a course on global history. Few scholars are so adept at tracing and describing complex phenomena, while making them accessible and engaging to students.

As you will read, there is no broad agreement on the value of Akira Iriye’s core contributions to international and global history – a focus on culture in historical analyses of power as well as the conviction that the transnational mattered as much as the national. As you work your way through, it will become clear that what we all share is a conviction that Akira Iriye’s life remains an important point of orientation for ambitious histories that matter.


Petra Goedde, Professor of History, Temple University, United States

From Culture and Power to the Transnational and Global: How Akira Iriye Showed the Way to a New Understanding of the World

There are essentially two paths to earning a reputation as a great historian.  One is the publication of a single field-defining tome that establishes a scholar’s reputation. Those scholars often build up to and then produce myriad variations of that work for the remainder of their careers. The other is marked by a lifetime of innovation fueled by an intellectual openness to new ideas and impulses reflected in a series of publications, each taking on a new subject matter that pushes scholarship in new directions, often before the field is ready. Akira Iriye belonged to the latter group. He established his reputation early in his career as a cutting-edge historian of US-East Asian relations after the publication of his first book After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931 (1965), based on his Harvard dissertation. It explored the shifting power dynamics in the Pacific region during the 1920s.[2] The study showcased his ability to explore international relations from multiple perspectives as well as his extraordinary language abilities. For the study he drew on British, Chinese, Japanese, German, U.S, and Soviet sources.

But Iriye did not leave it there.  After establishing himself as the foremost English-language historian of East Asian international relations, he spearheaded the cultural turn in US foreign relations history, followed by equally pathbreaking work in the internationalization of US history, the transnational turn, and ultimately as a champion of the new global history. At every turn, Iriye was ahead of his peers, who often read his work with some initial skepticism, eventually following in his footsteps when he was already moving on to the next turn.

I knew little of Iriye’s reputation in the field of US-East Asian relations, when I first encountered his work as a graduate student. His emphasis on the reciprocity between culture and power, and his method of incorporating anthropology, cultural analysis, and literary criticism deeply resonated with me and informed my own approach to the history or international relations. As I reread some of his key contributions for this tribute, I have been impressed anew not only by his astute understanding of big historical transformations, but by his ability to apply those lessons to the current moments in international affairs and his willingness to formulate a vision for the future. His writings are a most needed reminder of the enormous benefits that come with international cooperation and cross-cultural understanding. Iriye was a cosmopolitan humanist in the tradition of enlightenment-era aspirations for peace and international cooperation.[3]

Iriye’s 1978 presidential address to the Society for Historians of American Foreign relations might not have had many enthusiasts in the audience, but it did much to pave the way for a new approach to the study of international relations, integrating culture, race, and gender into the field of diplomatic history. Drawing on Michel Foucault, Antonio Gramsci, and other cultural theorists, and citing Edward Said’s then recently published work Orientalism (1978), he posited a new way of exploring the relationship between a country’s cultural system and its external relations, by viewing “‘culture’ and ‘power’ as two series interior to a cultural system and then to explore their interplay both within the system and with similar series in other cultural systems.”[4] For his lecture, he drew on material he had researched for his book, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945, which was to be published three years later.[5] That book was the first in the field of international relations that placed culture at the heart of the study of international relations, arguing that nations are “cultural systems” and that international relations therefore represent the interactions among different cultural systems. For Iriye, the study of international relations consisted of “three categories of inquiry: power-level interactions, cultural interchanges, and the relationship between these two sets of relations.”[6]

He ended his presidential address with a remark on the current state of international relations, urging his audience to take cultural understanding across national boundaries seriously in a world “that requires stability and order more than ever before.” For that stability to be secure and lasting, he argued, it cannot rest solely on a balance of power. “There must also be cultural stability, both in the sense of each society’s developing mechanism for stable development, and also in terms of a shared outlook across national boundaries on the pressing issues of the entire world, such as resource scarcity and nuclear proliferation.”[7] This statement reveals much about not only Iriye’s approach to history, but also his vision for a future of global peace, signaling a deeply held belief that a stable world order cannot be based on power alone but requires a system of cultural understanding and cooperation.

By the late 1990s, Iriye’s work had expanded into the realm of transnational and global history, beginning with a call to internationalize US history, moving on to developing the concept of transnational history, and ultimately exploring what he called “global community.”[8] In his 1988 American Historical Association (AHA) presidential address, he fused his earlier focus on exploring international relations from multiple perspectives with a new emphasis on the central importance of culture. As he had done a decade earlier, he identified manifestations of world order, which had traditionally been associated with power politics or economics. He called for more research to explore whether there is such a thing as an “international cultural order,” and suggested that historians could borrow from anthropologists, sociologists, and art historians, to “trace the forces that make for, or militate against the creation of an international cultural order.”[9] The task of future international historians would be to understand the precise relationship among power, economics, and culture within systems of global interaction.

With his 1997 book Cultural Internationalism and World Order Iriye put into practice the kind of scholarship he had suggested in his AHA address. In this volume we can also see the gradual move away from a predominantly state-centered understanding of international relations that privileged structures of power to a broader one that incorporated individuals and groups of people—intellectuals, artists, political activists—from different parts of the world who developed “an alternative community of nations and peoples on the basis of their cultural interchanges.” It was these groups and individuals, Iriye argued, who significantly contributed to our current understanding of international affairs. They are at the heart of what Iriye called “cultural internationalism.”[10] The book traced the emergence and proliferation of these groups and organizations from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century, when debates between internationalists and nationalists became increasingly polarized.  That polarization has only intensified in the twenty-first century, dampening the cautious hope Iriye expressed at the time, that if the commitment to the promotion of cross-cultural communication and cooperation could be sustained and strengthened, “there might eventually emerge an international order in which culture was restored to its central place.”[11] The world today might be as far from that ideal world order as it ever was in Iriye’s lifetime.

With his 2002 book Global Community Iriye turned his attention more systematically to the development of the field of global history.[12] Global Community brought interstate and non-state international organizations into a single analytical frame, revealing the interplay among them and showcasing the broad spectrum of global concerns in areas as diverse as politics, economics, environment, disease, and social change across national boundaries.[13] Building on the recent transnational turn, his methodology moved beyond an emphasis on culture to an emphasis on the interdependence among cultural, political, and economic factors. Again, current affairs informed his thinking: he was mindful of the fragile state of the cooperative spirit in a globalized world at the turn of the twenty-first century. Referring to the anti-globalization protests that had overshadowed the meetings of the World Trade Organization in Seattle in 1999, he argued that they were not so much signaling a fundamental opposition to globalization but rather a demand for a more equitable distribution of the benefits arising from the process of globalization.

The imprint of Iriye’s scholarship can be seen in many works in international, transnational, and global history over the last quarter century. Scholars of US foreign relations as well as international historians increasingly turned to exploring non-governmental organizations, global interconnections beyond the state, humanitarianism, human rights, and the environment as transnational subjects.[14] Iriye himself fostered the proliferation of transnational and global history in his later scholarship, including co-editing with Pierre-Yves Saunier the Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History; co-founding with Bruce Mazlish the Journal New Global Studies, now in its twentieth year of publication; and co-editing with Jürgen Osterhammel the History of the World, whose six volumes were published in multiple languages between 2012 and 2025.[15] His last monograph was our co-authored International History: A Cultural Approach, which reflected our vision of an international history that takes seriously the cultural influences that shape our world.[16]

In recent years the bonds of global connections appear to be fraying in the face of an increasingly toxic xenophobic, nationalist, and white-supremacist rhetoric, fueled by political parties and leaders who institute policies that are actively undermining an interdependent global world order. Whether these policies portend a permanent turn away from a globalist humanist and humanitarian vision of international relations remains to be seen.  The lesson from Akira Iriye’s scholarship for current and future historians might well be to double down on telling the stories of the remarkable individuals and organizations who worked hard to create a global community in which wealth, knowledge, and cultures are shared in a cooperative and equitable spirit, and to show their relevance for current and future human society.


Charles S. Maier, Leverett Saltonstall Professor Emeritus of History, Harvard University, United States

Culture in International History: A Collegial Dialogue

Akira Iriye and I, together with Ernest May –our common teacher — taught twentieth-century international history together for several years in the early 2000s; then after Ernest’s untimely death in 2008, Akira and I continued to lecture together as a duo. I treasured Akira as a colleague for his knowledge of American, East Asian, and international history, his command of difficult languages, and for his modesty and graciousness. We shared a commitment to teaching transnational and/or global history, and after Akira’s retirement, Sven Beckert and I co-taught a global history together until my retirement.

Akira rightly differentiated international or what we once called diplomatic history from transnational or global history. He was less interested in quarreling over the distinctions between the latter two terms than in highlighting their basic difference from the traditional accounts of state-centered relations. He admired his Chicago colleague, William H. McNeill’s concept of the ecumene. No scholar has been a greater champion than Akira of a transnational history in which cultures played a constitutive role; besides his own research in Asian and American history, he kept surveying all the emerging contributions and encouraging other efforts including the multivolume series co-edited with Emily Rosenberg and Jürgen Osterhammel, and his periodic surveys of the field: Cultural and International History in 1997 and then Global and Transnational History in 2013.[17] With his approval and encouragement, the agents taken into account for international, transnational and global history have all been widened significantly — economic actors, of course, but also epistemic communities of science, learning, tourism, and human rights. Writing this brief note during the World Cup competition, I am mindful that sports also belong among the globalizing forces.

Nonetheless, despite shared agendas and joint teaching, Akira and I had different underlying attitudes about international relations. Akira always believed the progress toward a global society structured by shared communities of culture was fundamental despite national loyalties.  He believed in the better angels of our nature; I remained more skeptical, such that power, interests, and the loyalties generated by the modern nation-state seemed fundamental to me. When we taught as a team, I sometimes thought we were playing a historiographical version of good cop-bad cop roles. Moreover, I had read enough of the earlier German invocations of culture and power to be suspicious that the term could be — to use the contemporary term — weaponized in the service of seeking domination. Given my specializations, Kulturcame with ominous overtones.

Although I read enough anthropology to understand that culture was a sort of shorthand term for the web of values and relationships that knit communities together, I find it difficult to evaluate its role in the structuring of an international system. I recognize that despite all the conflictual situations profound commonalities of values have operated across borders. We encounter them in artistic expression — consider the international or transnational styles of art and architecture– in sports, in commerce, religion, and in science and technology. Elites, including aristocracies and working-class parties alike, have built strong ties across borders although at crucial points –famously in 1914 and in the 1930s — these proved too weak to assure continued peace. For Akira, these shared activities, ideas, and values were what really counted in envisaging politics among nations because they were what really counted in forming communities at every level. I certainly agree they are worth studying, all the more so since they had been so neglected in our earlier teaching of international relations. It is their causal role that I find hard to specify.

Our different views — or perhaps attitudes cam perhaps in part be attributed to our personal histories. Akira was born in October 1934; he had lived as a young child in a country totally mobilized for war and by 1944-45 continuously punished from the air for that war. He experienced close at hand the air raids on Japan. After the war he had come to the United States under Quaker auspices and had attended Haverford College, founded as a Quaker institution. Despite the dangers of armchair psychologizing, I can’t help but believe that on an existential level Akira’s career was an intellectual effort to overcome the war that had separated his country of birth and his American homeland. I was born in February 1939; for me the war was a remote and heroic cause that hardly seemed to inflict personal costs. In 1955, I was sent as a 16-year-old by the American Field Service for a long summer in Germany. Sure, there were cultural differences between Germans and Americans, but history and politics seemed sufficient to account for both what had separated us as national actors in the first half of the twentieth century and was uniting us in a transatlantic community thereafter. Commentators who invoked culture were often arguing that the Germans could never really change. But Germans and Americans were reconstructing cultural systems as of the 1950s, including student exchanges, to bring us together for political goals. Perhaps culture was malleable. Or to argue from the inverse perspective, if culture constituted such a fundamental glue for peaceable international systems, why did the glue fail so spectacularly at many points in history? Had Akira and I each been ten to twenty years older, we might well have struggled to the death at Iwo Jima.

Nonetheless, Akira and I certainly shared a system of cultural values, those imparted by our academic and scholarly formation — the commitment to learning and teaching history as well as a belief that researching and writing about the past is valuable in its own right, that it helps orient action in the present, that it expands our minds and sense of shared humanity. One must hope that it will help get us through the global and domestic perils that currently assail us.  Akira and I would share that aspiration and effort. I will end with a personal note. From decades ago, when Akira was still teaching at Harvard, I remembered his wife, Mitsuko, as a cultivated and gracious woman who had spent formative years in Paris where her father served as Japanese ambassador. Happily, I had the chance to meet her again a few months ago at the Quaker senior living community near Philadelphia where Akira and she had retired. It reminded me how important friendship remained as a fundamental human value. But it, too, can be overpowered by the force of states and politics.


Liang Pan, Professor, Tsukuba University, Japan.

Remembering Akira

Professor Akira Iriye is undoubtedly one of the most outstanding historians of our time. Over the past few months, various media outlets have reported on his remarkable academic achievements, with many articles noting that he was a prolific scholar who made significant contributions to expanding the field of international relations history. In the early 1960s, he was one of the very few historians researching the origins of the Pacific War, focusing on international relations in the Asia-Pacific region during the 1920s and utilizing archival materials from the United States, Britain, Japan, and China (Taiwan), most of which had never been used in academic research before. In the 1970s and 1980s, Professor Iriye, along with several other American historians, transformed the traditional discipline of “diplomatic history” into the field of “international history,” viewing the international community from a broader perspective beyond the Cold War framework. Building on this effort, he began promoting the ideas of global and transnational history after the early 1990s.

Professor Iriye believed that the object of international history research should not be dominated by intergovernmental relations. He also acknowledged in his books and in private conversations with us that he was concerned about the nationalistic tendencies of international relations after the end of the Cold War. He once joked that although many people tend to become conservative as they get older, he seemed to have become more and more radical over time. In my view, he was never “radical,” but rather persistently explored new directions and methods to enhance our understanding of the international community. As an analyst, he never lost his keen insight and objectivity due to personal beliefs. During a meeting with him in a presidential election year in the early 2000s, I mentioned that some American media outlets predicted the Democratic candidate was likely to win the election. Although his political stance might have been closer to the Democratic Party, he frankly expressed his disagreement with these reports and clearly explained his reasons. The election results proved him right.

Professor Iriye was not only an outstanding scholar but also a kind and charming gentleman who always did his best to help the young students and colleagues around him. His students’ writings frequently recount these experiences. In his semi-autobiography published in 2005, one can also genuinely feel his care for his students and his sense of responsibility as an educator.[18] I was not his student, but even as a young postdoctoral fellow myself, whom he met late in his teaching career at Harvard, he never hesitated to offer advice and help. He frankly told me that diligence and luck are both indispensable for career success. He also gave me a very interesting piece of advice: don’t postpone marriage because of your career. In his personal life, Professor Iriye loved books and various art forms. In the summer of 2013, I was fortunate enough to spend a pleasant afternoon with him in Paris, where we searched for newly published academic works together at his favorite bookstore, Librairie Compagnie, and then went to see a modern art exhibition. In a small park in central Tokyo, I had another pleasant conversation with him and Mrs. Iriye, during which we naturally drifted into discussions of opera and the playing techniques of the legendary violinist Jascha Heifetz.

In short, Professor Iriye set an example for the younger generation of historians through his words and deeds: a passionate pioneer of international history, a dedicated mentor in academia, and a gentleman of genuine kindness in life. For me, my brief but fruitful and enjoyable interactions with him have become one of the most precious treasures of my life.


Glenda Sluga, Professor of International History and Capitalism, European University Institute, Italy

The History of Turning Transnational and International, National and Global

International history, as the history of relations between states, and of diplomacy, is the oldest form of the modern historical profession and its practices. Its earliest nineteenth-century iterations had the national-state’s foreign policy archive as the focus of its (at the time) new archive-focused scientific methodology. The nexus between the development of history as a modern discipline and the modern project of nation-building is now well-known and has been widely explored. In its late nineteenth century form as internationally-inclined political history (i.e. focused on relations between nations as well as nation-building), there was little to distinguish international history from international relations as fields, or, indeed, international relations from the history of empires and races. In “Birth of a discipline,” Robert Vitalis noted that in the United States, the study of international relations began as the study of history, but grounded in the study of race; the journal Foreign Affairs (1922) had an earlier life as Journal of International Relations (1919), and before that as the Journal of Race Development (1910).[19]

By the end of the twentieth century, international history was being re-fashioned in relation to the cultural turn. This new version regularly made categories such as race and nation – along with gender — the specific focus of analytical and historical deconstruction. Then there was the impact of the “transnational turn.”  A key text in this development in anglophone historiography was written by an Australian historian of United States history, Ian Tyrrell, then based at the University of New South Wales. In 1991, Tyrrell wrote an article in the American Historical Review entitled, ‘American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History,’ which predicted a new age of international history which would de-center the nation.[20] Reflecting on the late twentieth-century development of transnational history, Tyrrell argued that the idea had its roots in the work of Akira Iriye on Japan-US relations and the cultural links between these countries. In a 1989 article in the American Historical Review, Iriye had argued for an examination not just of nationalism (popular at the time), but also “internationalism.”[21] He also suggested the study of an explicitly “transnational cultural history” to complement purely national developments.

By the late 1990s, Iriye had made a broad increasingly influential argument for the importance of internationalizing history and incorporating the study of cultural internationalism.3 He raised the stakes of the “international” as an historical sub-field by focusing on the importance of ideas of “global community” and “international society” in the past. While this focus meant that he was (and still is) often critiqued as an “idealist,” books such as Cultural Internationalism and World Order (1997) and Global Community (2002) kick-started new historical ventures, linking cultural and political historical methods and objectives, and sketching out a new historiography of the social and cultural as well as political significance of (liberal) internationalism.[22]

In this genealogy, transnational history grew out of thinking about international history in ways that combined corresponding developments in social and cultural history and brought them to bear on political history.[23] Developments in historical focus and framing post-1991 also overlapped with a post-Cold War world and a new discourse of globalization that reinvigorated interest in the transnational, and with it, internationalism, and even cosmopolitanism. This same decade witnessed a heady combination of post-Cold War and millennial scenarios that anticipated not only the end of history, but a reinvigorated international political community cooperating through a resuscitated United Nations with expanded international legal instruments. By the 2000s, as unilateral action against terrorism became the main game, and the concept of the international community went into decline, the historical profession took up the idea of the “international” with ever greater enthusiasm.

In 2002, Lynn Hunt another American historian, best known for her work on the French revolution, but in this case presiding over the American Historical Association, described the field of international history  as “the next big thing.”[24] This “thing” was different from the international history that in the mid-nineteenth century had shaped the historical profession and taken as its raison d’être the nation’s rise and fall, and as its method the study of Außenpolitik or foreign policy and the agency of political elites. By contrast, the new international history resonated the lessons of the cultural history of the 1980s, as well as the historical fascination with transnationalism that had started up in the 1990s. Its themes included the modern significance of the international as a political idea, international organizations as political spaces, and internationalism as an ideology that overlapped and intersected with, even as it ran counter to, the history of nations and nationalism.

By the early 2000s, transnational history intersected with global history to produce Mark Mazower’s critical No Enchanted Palace (2009), and Governing the World (2012), my own Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism (2013), and Madeleine Herren’s work on the ‘geography’ of transnationalism – from Internationale Organisationen seit 1865. Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung (2009), to her co-authored Transcultural History. Theories, Methods, Sources (2012).[25] Herren’s University of Heidelberg-based and European Union-funded research consortium studying Asia and Europe in a global context reinforced the view that transnational norms and experiences seen through international organizations had a long history among constituencies that European historians tended to ignore. Herren was able to show that the transnational history of international organizations belongs as much to Asia as to the “Western” bureaucracies.

In the globalized world of the twenty-first century, international organizations attracted growing historical interest as significant transnational sites. Overall, the new interest in the transnational and global made it easier to seek out the significance both of the international as a political space, and of internationalism as an ideology that overlapped with, even as it ran counter to, the history of nations and nationalism in places where one might not expect to find it. Recent historical interest in “Black Internationalism” might also fit in this genealogy of moments.  Despite “the lack of precision around terminology,” it is not a stretch to consider the interchangeable use of “Black Internationalism,” “Pan-Africanism,” and “diaspora” as capturing a cosmopolitan experience and outlook that underscores the limits of methodological nationalism for incorporating the experiences of black populations, and harvests a rich crop of non-national, and anti-national, as well as national, political thought.[26]

The diverse methodologies of integrated universal history, scalar experimentation, and Black internationalisms are not easily assimilable, either in category or period, or motivation. Yet they reprise a long history of ambitions and expectations, even imperatives, that echo those that have inspired transnational histories of various kinds – from international to global to (now) planetary. They share the intent to avoid and transcend the limits of methodological nationalism, whether conceptually or politically, and they arrive replete with tensions of inclusion and exclusion, deconstruction and reification. In this history, Akira’s own contribution was relatively forgotten. In particular, a whole school of international history engaged with the League of Nations forgot the cultural roots of this shift.  What do international or even national historians have to gain from thinking about the transnational past of international history? Akira Iriye’s death, and the concatenation of geopolitical crises we are witnessing has returned me to Akira’s work and its significance in the context of international history – even global history — now: not only his influence, but also the shift away from his transnational project. Iriye’s transnational concerns of the 1990s and early 2000s have been lost in the dominant historiographical practices of today. They are worth remembering for their fundamental challenge to the premises of methodological nationalism that all too often remain unchallenged by the narratives of internationalism that are in our historical purview


[1] Akira Iriye, “Introduction,” in David Wolff et al., eds, The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero, vol. II (Brill, 2007), 1-10.

[2] Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931(Harvard University Press,1965).

[3] His scholarship echoes some of the precepts articulated in Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, (Königsberg, 1795), particularly Kant’s ideas about establishing a federation of states and the precept of “universal hospitality.”

[4] Akria Iriye, “Culture and Power,” Diplomatic History 3, no. 2 (1979): 117.

[5] Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945 (Harvard University Press, 1981).

[6] Iriye, Power and Culture, vii.

[7] Iriye, “Culture and Power,” Diplomatic History 3, no. 2 (1979): 128.

[8] Iriye was not the only historian to develop this concept, but he was among its earliest adopters. Others included Ian Tyrrell and Patrick Manning. For a historiographical overview see his Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present, and Future (Palgrave/Macmillan, 2013).

[9] Akira Iriye, “The Internationalization of History,” The American Historical Review 94, no. 1 (1989): 1-10, here 8.

[10] Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 2.

[11] Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, 185.

[12] Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World (University of California Press, 2002).

[13] He focused on six types of organizations: humanitarian relief, cultural exchange, peace and disarmament, development assistance, human rights and environmentalism.  Iriye, Global Community, 3.

[14] The list is too long to cite here, but some recent works include Barbara Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s (Harvard University Press, 2014); Sarah B. Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: Transnational History of the Helsinki Network (Cambridge University Press, 2011); Julia Irwin, Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation’s Humanitarian Awakening (Oxford University Press, 2013); Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin, eds. Internationalisms: A Twentieth Century History(Cambridge University Press, 2017); Petra Goedde, The Politics of Peace: A Global Cold War History (Oxford University Press 2019); Frank Zellko, Make it a Green Peace: The Rise of Countercultural Environmentalism (Oxford University Press, 2013); (Sandrine Kott, transl. Arby Gharibian. A World More Equal: AN Internationalist Perspective on the Cold War (Columbia University Press, 2024). For an overview see Erez Manela, “International Society as a Historical Subject,” Diplomatic History 44, no.2 (2020): 184-209.

[15] Akira Iriye and Pierre Yves Saunier, eds. The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History (Palgrave, 2009); Jürgen Osterhammel and Akira Iriye, eds, A History of the World, 6 Volumes (Harvard University Press, 2012-2025); simultaneously published in German as Die Geschichte der Welt, Bd 1-6 (C.H. Beck, 2012-2025).

[16] Akira Iriye and Petra Goedde, International History: A Cultural Approach (Bloomsbury Press, 2022).

[17] Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Akira Iriye, Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present, and Future (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

[18] Akira Iriye, Rekishi wo manabu to iu koto [Studying history] (Kodansha, 2005).

[19] Robert Vitalis, “Birth of a Discipline,” in David Long and Brian C. Schmidt, eds., Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations (State University of New York Press, 2005), 159-182.

[20] Ian Tyrrell, “American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History,” The American Historical Review 96, no. 4 (1991): 1031-1055.

[21] Akira Iriye, “The Internationalization of History,” The American Historical Review 94, no. 1 (1989): 1-10.

[22] Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World (University of California Press, 2002).

[23] There is of course is another related genealogy of the concept of transnationalism itself, which grew out of political science studies of international institutions in the 1970s.

[24] Lynn Hunt, “The World We Have Gained: The Future of the French Revolution,” The American Historical Review 108, no. 1 (2003): 1-19.

[25] Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton University Press, 2009); Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present (Penguin, 2012); Glenda Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Madeleine Herren, Internationale Organisationen seit 1865. Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung (WBG Verlag, 2009); Madeleine Herren, Martin Rüesch, and Christiane Sibille, Transcultural History. Theories, Methods, Sources (Springer-Verlag Berlin, 2012).

[26] Kira Thurman, “AHR Conversation: Black Internationalism,” in “AHR Conversation: Black Internationalism,” The American Historical Review 125, no. 5 (2020), 1699–1739; see also Sarah Dunstan, Race, Rights and Reform: Black Activism in the French Empire and the United States from World War I to the Cold War (University of California Press, 2021).